Electoral reform is essential if democracy and liberty are to flourish. The current system means any general election is decided by 100,000 voters spread across 100 marginal constituencies, with most other constituencies and voters rendered irrelevant. Consequently most voters and most political views are taken for granted, and diversity of policies suffers. In addition, the Lords is unelected, unrepresentative, illegitimate and unable to hold the Commons to account. Yet each house has its virtues. The constituency format of the Commons gives each voter a personal representative in Parliament, while the Lords contains many people of great wisdom.
The aim is to establish a new electoral process that combines the best of the existing system with improvements that increase democracy. (i) Keep the constituency model for the Commons, but elect each member using the single transferable vote. Each member will then require the support of over 50% of first or second preference votes. (ii) Use PR for the Lords using the party list method. Elect 1/3 of members every two years, as in the US Senate. Each sits for 6 years, but (unlike the US) must stand down for at least another 6 years.
The only extra cost will be for elections to the Lords every 2 years, and possibly additional salary and support costs. By forcing members of the Lords to stand down after 6 years you make them more independent. They can’t be whipped into voting on party lines if they aren’t standing for re-election. The list system allows people to be selected who are not natural campaigners, as most campaigning would be by the party leaders. That would allow many of the current Lords to be selected on the basis of their professional expertise.
By using the STV for the Commons you make every vote count, unless the winning candidate gets 51% of first preferences. This would increase turn-out in most constituencies. PR in the Lords would allow parties to distinguish themselves from each other, giving the voter more choice, and thereby increasing voter turn-out. The existing Commons would oppose it because it would mean sharing democratic legitimacy with the Lords. The Parliament act would have to go, and the two houses would need to find consensus. This consensus would more reflect the country at large though.
Many countries have systems that work better than our elected dictatorship. The USA is the best example of separation of powers. If it fails in the USA, it is not because of the constitutional arrangement, but because of the way bills are put together (the so-called pork-barrel politics where self-serving amendments are added) and the way each elected member has to raise his own campaign contributions, which make him beholden to lobbyists before voters or party.
The advantages of this system are that it combines the best of all possible systems. By electing 1/3 of the Lords at a time you ensure gradual change and stability in the upper house, compared to the dramatic change that can occur in the Commons at a general election. The fixed term limit of 6 years means that most Lords will be part-time temporary politicians with experience of the outside world. The main disadvantage is that the list system may tempt some parties to pack their list with old has-beens from the Commons. So no change there!
One additional refinement would be to limit voting for the second chamber to people living in England. That would kick the “West Lothian question” into touch without the need for a separate English parliament, as English voters would then have an effective veto by PR over all Government legislation. They could not then argue, as the Tories now do, that the Scots and Welsh are deciding on legislation that only affects England.
The two alternatives to this are both unpalatable.
The Tory proposal of a Grand Committee of English-only MPs in the Commons is wholly undemocratic as it is not based on PR and has a built-in Tory advantage. This is because the way constituency boundaries are drawn up gives Labour an electoral advantage in Scotland and Wales, but in contrast disdadvantages Labour in England. For the Tories the reverse is true. So the Grand Committee would always over-represent the Tories.
A separate English parliament would undermine Westminster, just as the Russian parliament under Yeltsin undermined the authority of Gorbachev from 1990. It would inevitably lead to Westminster been seen as a “rump parliament” of little relevance, and the national parliaments (particularly the large English parliament) would demand ever more power. This would inevitably result in the break-up of the UK for the same reasons that the old USSR broke up.
The political classes appear to believe that democracy is only about winning elections, and then afterwards exercising absolute unrestricted power. I disagree. I see elections as the first step in a two-stage process. First you need to win the popular vote, then you need to win the argument for each policy in Parliament.
Some will argue that these proposals make it more difficult for governments to pass legislation. This is true, but I see this as an advantage, not a disadvantage. The current system allows the Government to steamroller ever increasing numbers of badly thought out bills through both houses with little scrutiny or debate, then pass even worse legislation to try and correct the deficiencies of the previous lot. We need less government, but better government. If governments are forced to argue the case to win support for each bill, the bills will be better crafted and more workable.
Many favour electoral reform because it increases the diversity of political opinions that are represented in Parliament. What is often overlooked, is the lack of diversity in individual personalities that the current political system engenders. The constituency model of representation favours those who are extrovert performers to the point of exhibiting demagogue-like tendencies. Yet where is it proven that such personality traits are in any way correlated with higher intelligence, or any other virtue? Many intelligent, thoughtful people are more introverted, and therefore less attracted to the current political milieu. If we are to reverse the decline in respect for politicians we must redress this and encourage such people to participate, just as we currently try to widen access to ethnic groups and women. This is why I favour the list system for the second chamber.
I have never understood the attraction of the House of Lords, which is still an outdated concept, despite recent (slight) revisions. It still smacks too much of patronage.
Far better, in my view, would be to have strong standing committees of the Commons, which would be remitted to scrutinise proposed legislation. The advantage of this would be that membership would be drawn from elected members and, for once, give back-benchers and opposition members something to do, apart from being lobby-fodder.
It’s a system, which works well in the Scottish Parliament. In addition you might want to consider the idea of a petitions committee, which would consider any proposals from ordinary members of the public, whose views aren’t really considered outwith elections.
Martin, I am not arguing for the House of Lords, but for a second democratic chamber. Are you in favour of a second democratic chamber or not? My argument is that we need more than one chamber so that we can accommodate more than one type of electoral system and institute a system of checks an balances. I want Alternative Vote for the Commons and List PR for the upper chamber.
As for standing committees, we already have select committees, and they are generally toothless. Why would standing committees be any more independent when those same MPs always follow the party whip in the end, otherwise they get deselected. The significant feature of the Scottish Parliament is that it has a form of PR (the Addition Member System).
This proposal should advocate Alternative Vote for the Commons, not STV. I think it is also worth noting that Sunder Katwala, General Secretary of the Fabian Society, advocated a similar system to the one I propose back in 2007. See http://fabians.org.uk/publications/extracts/call-for-lab-libdem-deal-on-alternative-vote
However, my proposal has three further refinements for the Lords. (i) Sunder was still advocating a 20% nominated component. (ii) I like the idea of representatives being elected 1/3 every two years to make the chamber representative of opinion over an extended period of time. (iii) By only allowing members to sit for one 6-year term they will be more independent, and more people will get the chance to be elected.
Posting Comment...
March 3rd, 2009 at 5:21 am
The political classes appear to believe that democracy is only about winning elections, and then afterwards exercising absolute unrestricted power. I disagree. I see elections as the first step in a two-stage process. First you need to win the popular vote, then you need to win the argument for each policy in Parliament.